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I. INTRODUCTION
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)1 makes it illegal to trade a
contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery-a
"futures contract"-unless the contract is executed on a federally desig-
nated exchange. 2 Despite its long history of trouble-free administration
and operation, this central premise of futures regulation recently has
been attacked as unworkable and undesirable. Some argue that the re-
quirement discourages commercially useful off-exchange transactions.3
They claim that even if such transactions fall within the letter of the
requirement, off-exchange transactions do not implicate the trading re-
striction's policy concerns. 4 In contrast, others suggest that off-exchange
* J.D., Northwestern, 1983; M.A., Econ., Northwestern, 1984; A.B., Oberlin, 1978. Mr. Stein is
associated with the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago, Illinois.
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982) (as amended).
2. Id.§2.
3. See Gerstell, Developments in Off-Exchange Financial Products, 21 REv. SEC. & COMMOD-
ITIES REG. 1 (1988); Karr, Climb in Off-Exchange Futures Sales Challenges CFTC, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 3, 1987, at 10, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities
and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986); Schroeder, Will Off-Exchange Contracts
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transactions threaten the safety and soundness of the international fi-
nancial system,5 and violate the clear language of the CEA. The out-
come of this debate will have a profound impact on risk management
and the futures industry for years to come.
The purpose of this Article is to review this longstanding and now
controversial exchange-trading requirement-including its origins,
scope, and current relevance. Parts II and III of this Article examine
the historical evolution of forward and futures contracts and present an
overview of federal regulation of commodity futures from 1921 to the
present. Part IV explores in detail the legislative history of the ex-
change-trading requirement. Particular emphasis is placed on the
meaning of a narrow statutory exception to the requirement called the
"forward contract exclusion." In Part V the "Treasury Amendment,"
adopted in 1974, is reviewed and determined to be a clarification of the
forward contract exclusion. Following an examination of the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission's jurisdiction over futures trading in
Part VI, Part VII analyzes a proposal to carve out a "safe harbor" from
the exchange-trading requirement for futures transactions by commer-
cial institutions. That section concludes that the proposal finds no sup-
port in the language or legislative history of the CEA and ignores
important congressional policy considerations. Overall, this Article finds
that the CEA, as presently structured, appropriately determines what
instruments must be traded on designated exchanges and accommo-
dates all commercially useful transactions.'
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FUTURES TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES
The first commodity markets in the United States appeared during
the late eighteenth century.7 These regional cash or "spot" markets pro-
vided little more than gathering places for producers, processors, and
consumers." Although these markets aided the distribution of goods by
uniting buyers and sellers interested in immediate cash transactions, a
serious problem remained for the grain farmer. Since most farmers sold
Set Off Industry Civil War?, FUTURES, Mar. 1987, at 54; Schroeder, Inadvertent Futures Con-
tracts, 19 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 89, 90-91 (1986); The Forward Contract Exclusion: An
Analysis of Off-Exchange Commodity-Bases Instruments, 41 Bus. LAw. 853 (1986).
5. See Fin. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at 25, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1986, at D1, col. 1.
6. The scope of this Article is limited to an examination of futures contracts and the statu-
tory requirement that they be traded only on federally designated exchanges. Commodity options
and leverage contracts, which are governed by distinct statutory provisions, are not discussed
substantively.
7. See S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982).
8. Although these early markets traded eggs, butter, vegetables, and other commodities, the
remainder of the discussion in this section will concentrate on grain markets because of their spe-
cial role in the evolution of futures trading.
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the bulk of their production at harvest time, brokers and millers re-
duced their bids because supply greatly exceeded their short-term
needs. During times when the market could not absorb the seasonal
glut at any price, grain was dumped on the streets. Yet several months
after a harvest, shortages developed, prices soared, and people starved.
Businesses sputtered for lack of raw materials.9 Storage facilities were
built to solve this distribution problem. Storage elevators enabled farm-
ers to hold their grain until an acceptable price was available. These
facilities also enabled millers and other users to inventory grain for fu-
ture use.
The first forward contracts were a natural consequence of limited
storage space, spasmodic demand for cash grains, and inefficient trans-
portation systems. Occasionally a large buyer could not satisfy his com-
mitments with the grain in stock at a terminal market. He would then
contract to buy the needed grain from nearby rural sellers. Because it
often took several days to transport the grain from the countryside to
the terminal market, the contracts called for delivery of the cash grain
within some fixed period of time, i.e., "to-arrive" at the terminal mar-
ket in five days, one week, etc.10 Similarly, commodities loaded onto
ships were sold "to-arrive" at distant ports in several weeks or
months." By the 1850s, buyers and sellers recognized the utility of for-
ward contracting not only as a method of allowing for transportation
time, but as a general method of merchandising a seasonal crop."
The benefits of forward contracting were numerous. Brokers and
processors could assure themselves of supplies without investing di-
rectly in storage. Moreover, forwarding allowed farmers to sell grain
they expected to harvest and brokers to sell inventories they expected
to acquire. These transactions facilitated the efficient distribution of
grain over time by managing the temporal supply of grain with mer-
chandising contracts for actual grain.13
Futures contracts developed as a solution to a very different prob-
lem. A declining market meant that executory agreements (such as "to-
9. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357 (1982); S. REP.
No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982).
10. 1 C. TAYLOR, HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 193 (1917).
11. See In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 21,707, at 26,773 (C.F.T.C., Apr. 29, 1983), rev'd, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) q 22,698 (C.F.T.C., Aug. 7, 1985).
12. Cf. 1 C. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 192-93, 206-08, 217, 256.
13. "To-arrive" contracts apparently were not uncommon in Chicago even as it took its first
steps toward becoming a major grain marketing center. In the same issue announcing formation of
the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Daily Journal reported in its trade and commerce col-
umn: "We hear of a sale of 5,000 bushels corn to arrive in May, on private terms." Id. at 138
(citing Chicago Daily Journal, Apr. 1, 1848).
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arrive" contracts) were more valuable to sellers than the commodities
covered by the contracts because the commodities could be purchased
in the spot market for less than the contract prices. In a rising market,
however, executory contracts held special value for buyers, who not
only were assured of delivery of the commodity but also could derive a
profit from price increases."'
If grain prices remained relatively stable, commercial interests as-
sumed little risk by holding inventories, little opportunity existed for
speculative profit, and little danger existed for speculative loss. The
1850s and 1860s, however, produced anything but stable commodity
prices. In particular, the suspension of payments in specie by the
United States Treasury and its introduction of greenbacks as the pri-
mary medium of exchange brought on an era of paper currency dis-
counting, which fundamentally affected the conduct of all business.
Greenbacks and gold specie were not treated as comparable stores of
value. In effect a twenty dollar greenback was worth less than a twenty
dollar gold coin. This discounting was tied to the "gold premium,"
which fluctuated with the fortunes of the Union forces during the
United States Civil War, increasing with setbacks and decreasing with
victories. As the gold premium fluctuated, so too did the price of goods.
Any accurate forecast of future grain prices included an implicit predic-
tion of the gold premium. 15
Other events also worked fundamental changes on the markets.
The Crimean War, recurring crop failures, and the continuing develop-
ment of farmlands in the Northwest Territories and lands west of the
Mississippi prompted much speculation and uncertainty in the supply
of, and demand for, foodstuffs." These factors made it risky to hold
grain inventories. Brokers in Chicago who had to store grain when the
Great Lakes were closed to shipping (and when market liquidity was
thin) recognized that the value of their inventories often changed before
they could sell the commodities to buyers on the Eastern Seaboard or
in Europe.17 While many merchants were more than happy to speculate
on the value of their stocks of grain, others simply wanted to secure a
fair return on their investment and labor. Futures contracts evolved to
permit the transfer of unwanted price risk from these risk averse
merchants to those more willing or better able to bear such risk.18
14. Curran, 456 U.S. at 357.
15. C. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 306-07, 316.
16. Id. at 192-323.
17. Id. at 147.
18. Cf. In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,707, at 26,773 (C.F.T.C., Apr. 29, 1983), rev'd, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) t 22,698 (C.F.T.C., Aug. 7, 1985).
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL FUTURES REGULATION
In the early twentieth century, the perception that large specula-
tors on grain exchanges manipulated prices to the detriment of produc-
ers and consumers fueled a populist movement to regulate or abolish
futures trading. The movement's efforts culminated in enactment of the
Future Trading Act of 1921 (FTA).' The statute's primary purpose was
to regulate the boards of trade on which futures trading occurred in
order to prevent the price manipulations that many believed resulted
from excessive speculation. Congress, through the FTA, also sought to
destroy bucket shops,2' which were businesses that offered small inves-
tors the opportunity to speculate on the price of commodities. Custom-
ers wagered on the fluctuation of exchange prices in private, unreported
deals. The bucket shops matched customer orders against each other
and assumed the risk of any net positions. When the market moved
against the shops, they usually closed in haste and their owners disap-
peared, leaving customers with uncollectable claims.2
Congress acknowledged the legitimacy of futures contracts as risk
shifting devices essential to the marketing of grain. It also recognized
the need for speculative capital to provide liquidity to the markets, yet
Congress sought to channel and control the speculative instincts of in-
vestors. 23 This goal would be accomplished by monitoring the ex-
changes' oversight of their members and by imposing a prohibitive tax
on all futures trading conducted outside federally designated exchanges.
Federal designation hinged on the exchanges' continued compliance
with various provisions designed to insure fair and efficient conduct of
business, particularly the elimination of manipulation.
19. Future Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187; see infra note 24 and accom-
panying text (key provision of Act later declared unconstitutional).
20. H.R. REP. No. 44, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921) (stating that "while [this measure] will
not abolish speculation, or what is known to the trade as the 'legitimate hedge,' it will absolutely
destroy manipulation"); see also 61 CONG. REC. 1317 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Purnell) (stating that
"[t]he one overshadowing evil that must be eliminated is manipulation").
21. See, e.g., 61 CONG. Rac. 1318 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Voight) (stating that "[t]he bucket
shop is wiped out in this bill, because a bucket shop is not a contract market"); 132 CONG. REC.
S17023 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Melcher) (stating that "[tihe mayhem caused by
commodity bucket shops is what caused Congress, over 60 years ago, to create a broad futures
contract definition and require all lawful futures to be traded on federally approved exchanges").
22. See C. COWING, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS, AND PROGREssIvEs 27-28 (1965). For a comprehen-
sive study of bucket shops, see J. HILL, GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION (1975 reprint of 1904 ed.).
23. See, e.g., Future Trading: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 66th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1043 (1921); Future Trading in Grain: Hearings on H.R. 5676 Before the Senate Comm.
on Agriculture and Forestry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1921); 61 CONG. REc. 4761 (1921) (remarks
of Sen. Capper) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Future Trading]; 132 CONG. REC. S15283 (daily
ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan) (stating that "[y]ears ago, Congress decided to har-
ness [speculative impulses] by requiring all commodity futures contracts to be traded openly and
competitively on federally approved exchanges").
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In 1922 the Supreme Court declared a key provision of the FTA an
improper exercise of the taxing power.24 Congress responded with the
Grain Futures Act of 1922 (GFA),25 which recognized the same benefits,
and attempted to curtail the same perceived speculative abuses, of fu-
tures trading, but this time through the exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.26 Except for the addition of certain defini-
tions and a new section declaring that futures trading was "affected
with a national public interest," the GFA contained no material
changes from the regulatory provisions of the FTA With the removal
of the FTA's unconstitutional reliance on the taxing power, the Su-
preme Court upheld the statute.28
In 1936 Congress amended the GFA extensively and renamed it the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).29 The legislation extended regulatory
coverage to additional commodities, gave a commission the power to
impose speculative position limits, outlawed various fraudulent activi-
ties, and added to the arsenal of sanctions available to punish violators.
In enacting the CEA, Congress emphasized again the paramount policy
concerns of preventing manipulation and of outlawing bucket shops.3
Following some minor changes in 1968,"' the CEA was amended exten-
sively in 1974.32 The amendments expanded the definition of "commod-
ity," created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and
granted the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading. Since
1974, the CEA has been amended in 1978,33 1982,s" and 1986.'5
24. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
25. Grain Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
26. S. REP. No. 871, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1922).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1095, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1922); see also Regulation of Leverage Con-
tracts, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,772, at 23,168 (C.F.T.C.,
1979).
28. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
29. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
30. For example, fear was expressed that, absent further regulation, large speculators from
the newly regulated securities markets would flock to the commodities markets and increase the
risk of manipulations. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 9623 Before the
House Comm. on Rules, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
31. Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
32. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
33. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
34. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
35. Futures Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-23 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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IV. THE EXCHANGE-TRADING REQUIREMENT
The CEA prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of an order for, or
otherwise dealing "in, or in connection with, a contract for the purchase
or sale of a commodity for future delivery," unless the transaction is
conducted on, or subject to the rules of, a federally designated contract
market.3 6 This provision, which is the cornerstone of all futures regula-
tion,37 first appeared in a slightly different form in a draft of the FTA.
The House version of the FTA would have imposed a prohibitive tax
"upon each contract of sale of grain for future delivery made at, on, or
in an exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of busi-
ness, except. . . where the contracts are made by or through a mem-
ber" of a federally designated contract market. 8
The Senate, however, feared that this wording would not prohibit
bucket shops. It recognized the ingenuity of unscrupulous businessmen
and the opportunity that the language of the House bill would create
for scoundrels and con artists to develop private off-exchange futures
contracts-contracts technically not within the language of the bill be-
cause the contracts would not be made "at, on, or in an exchange."3 9
For these reasons, the preceding emphasized language was removed.
The House agreed to its removal in the conference committee.
For reasons now obscure, the GFA (restyled the CEA in 1936) did
not adopt the same wording. Section 4 of the statute outlawed transac-
tions in "any contract of sale of grain for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any board of trade in the United States. . .except...
where such contract is made by or through a member of [a federally
designated contract market] .'140 The inclusion of this language, particu-
larly in light of the wranglings over similar language in the FTA, could
be interpreted as an indication that Congress intended the exchange-
trading requirement to extend only to contracts made on "any board of
36. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (1982). Knowing violations of the requirement are punishable by crimi-
nal fines and imprisonment. Id. § 13(b).
37. Cf. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,941, at
23,781 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 6, 1979); 132 CONG. REC. S15283 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (remarks of Sen.
Moynihan) (stating that the exchange-trading requirement is the "founding principle of Federal
futures law").
38. H.R. 5676, 67th Cong, 1st Sess. § 4 (1921) (as passed by the House and referred to the
Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee) (emphasis added). See infra notes 73-112 and accom-
panying text for a more detailed discussion of the 1921 definitional debate.
39. Congressional concerns over loopholes in the CEA that might create incentives to trade
futures off-exchange remain to this day. See 132 CONG. REc. S17023 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (re-
marks of Sen. Melcher) (stating that "[w]e do not want unscrupulous con artists and bucket shop
operators to seize this inadvertent loophole [- the provision for off-exchange leverage trading -]
and design other nonfutures contracts that will not need to be traded on exchanges").
40. Grain Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, § 4, 42 Stat. 998, 999 (current version at 7
U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982) (emphasis added)).
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trade in the United States."
The CFTC, however, has pointed out that "[s]uch an interpretation
would leave untouched any private exchange or bucket shop operation
which is arguably not a board'of trade" and would thereby undercut the
central objective of futures regulation-to require all contracts of sales
in regulated commodities to be executed on designated exchanges.4 '
Consequently, the CFTC "unequivocally" has reaffirmed "that all con-
tracts for the sale of commodities for future delivery [must] be executed
... on a contract market designated by this Commission. '42 Courts
uniformly have reached the same conclusion.43
Another weakness in section 4 of the CEA was that, while it re-
quired a member of a designated exchange to execute all contracts of
sale of a commodity for future delivery, it did not specify literally that
the contracts had to be executed through the facilities of a contract
market. Thus, the statute could have been read to permit exchange
members to buy and sell futures contracts off-exchange. This interpre-
tation, however, also has been rejected as contrary to congressional in-
tent.44 Generally, courts have interpreted section 4 broadly to require
that all trading of futures contracts occur on designated exchanges.
Other provisions of the CEA support this conclusion. In 1936 Con-
gress added two new sections addressing the question of off-exchange
practices. Section 4h made it unlawful for any person
to conduct any office or place of business anywhere in the United States or its
territories for the purpose of soliciting or accepting any orders for the purchase or
sale of any commodity for future delivery, or for making or offering to make any
contracts for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery, or for con-
ducting any dealings in commodities for future delivery . . if such orders, con-
tracts, or dealings are executed or consummated otherwise than by or through a
41. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,941, at 23,781
(C.F.T.C., Dec. 6, 1979). The CFTC here addressed statutory language (in force between 1968 and
1982) substantively similar to that of section 4 of the GFA. See infra notes 45-52 and accompany-
ing text.
42. Id.
43. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573,
576-79 (9th Cir. 1982); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Commercial Petrolera Interna-
cional, S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,222, at 25,088 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 1981); In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 21,707, at 26,776 (C.F.T.C., Apr. 29, 1983), rev'd on other grounds, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,698 (C.F.T.C., Aug. 7, 1985). In Co Petro the Ninth Cir-
cuit took a slightly different approach, concluding that the term "board of trade" as used in § 4's
phrase "on or subject to the rules of any board of trade" was "broad enough to encompass Co
Petro's [off-exchange] activities here." Id. at 581.
44. See, for example, Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,941, in which the respondent was a member of two contract markets when he executed the
challenged off-exchange futures contracts. Following an exhaustive analysis of the legislative his-
tory of § 4, as well as the history of futures trading in general, the CFTC concluded "that Congress
could not have intended such a narrow application." Id. at 23, 782 n.28.
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member of a contract market.45
This section prohibited "operation of a place of business where orders
for futures contracts are solicited or accepted unless such orders are to
be executed by or through a member of a contract market. 4 6 Read lit-
erally, the section continued the earlier pattern of loose legislative
draftsmanship. It required only that futures contracts be executed or
consummated by a member of a contract market, although not necessa-
rily through the facilities of a contract market.
Section 4b was enacted at the same time, and prohibited members
of a contract market from "bucketing" customer orders. 47 "Bucketing"
included any transaction in which the member assumed the other side
of his customers' orders, or matched customer orders against each
other. The evil of bucketing was that it sidestepped the competitive
open outcry auctions which take place on the floors of exchanges.48
Taken together, these sections prohibited all off-exchange futures trad-
ing: Section 4h required future-delivery business to be conducted
through a member of a contract market and section 4b required con-
tract market members to conduct future-delivery business through the
facilities of a designated contract market.
Unfortunately, Congress could not leave well enough alone and
amended section 4b in 1968 to expand the application of its bucketing
prohibition beyond contract market members to "any person. '49 In so
doing, it inadvertently restructured the section in a way that created
the same linguistic ambiguity which existed prior to 1936.50 In 1982
Congress eliminated the ambiguity again when it adopted the CFTC's
recommendation to combine sections 4 and 4h into the current section
6(a), which makes it unlawful for any person to transact in "a contract
for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery. . . unless
. . . such transaction is conducted on or subject to the rules" of a feder-
ally designated contract market.51 By requiring all futures to be exe-
45. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491, 1496 (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)).
46. H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1935).
47. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491, 1493 (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)).
48. See 80 CONG. REc. 8088 (1936) (document discussing trade terminology offered into rec-
ord by Sen. Pope) (stating that "[bucketing and bucket shops] are terms used to describe a
method of doing business wherein orders of customers for the purchase or sale of commodities for
future delivery, instead of being executed by bona-fide purchases and sales with other traders, are
simply matched and offset in the soliciting firm's own office and the firm itself takes the opposite
side of customers' orders").
49. S. REP. No. 947, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
50. Congressional intent to require that all futures transactions take place on designated ex-
changes apparently did not change. See S. RaP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974).
51. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982).
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cuted on contract markets, Congress ended any speculation that
members of contract markets could conduct off-exchange futures
business.
The CFTC has consistently interpreted the CEA to prohibit all off-
exchange futures contracts. In 1979 it issued a proposed statutory inter-
pretation that concluded:
Congress has evinced a strong intention to regulate all persons engaged in the busi-
ness of buying, selling, offering, accepting and otherwise dealing in contracts for the
future delivery of commodities, and has done so by requiring that no such business
may be conducted unless it. . . is conducted through the facilities of an exchange
that has met the criteria for designation by the Commission as a contract market.
Any public offering of these contracts other than through the facilities of a desig-
nated contract market is unlawful.52
Courts and commentators have construed the CEA similarly to require
exchange trading of all futures contracts.53
A. The Policy Behind the Exchange-Trading Requirement
Restricting futures trading to designated exchanges is supported by
unequivocal statutory language (certainly since 1982), CFTC interpreta-
tions and decisions, federal court holdings, and sound policy considera-
tions.54 Unlike unregulated over-the-counter markets, futures exchanges
provide centralized liquid markets that promote price discovery. Unlike
unregulated over-the-counter markets, exchanges must demonstrate
that the contracts they trade will not be contrary to the public interest
and must make an elaborate CFTC-required showing that these con-
tracts serve an underlying economic purpose other than mere specula-
tion.5 5 In addition, unlike unregulated over-the-counter markets,
52. Regulation of Leverage Transactions as Contracts for Future Delivery or Otherwise,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,772, at 23,170 (C.F.T.C., Mar. 12,
1979) (emphasis added); see also In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,941 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 6, 1979).
53. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 361 n.14 (1982); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro, 680 F.2d 566, 582 n.14 (9th Cir. 1982); First Nat'l
Monetary Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 677 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1982); Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. National Coal Exch., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also
Schroeder & Pollock, Commodities Regulation, 8 REv. SEc. REG. 935, 936 (1975) (stating that
"[t]he Commodity Exchange Act contemplates that all futures trading in the U.S. will take place
on regulated exchanges-in other words, there will be no over-the-counter market in futures");
Representative Dan Glickman, FUTURES, Sept. 1985, at 38 (stating that "commodity futures law
restricts futures trading to organized, federally sanctioned exchanges, a restriction which should
remain in effect for now"); 132 CONG. REC. S13586 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (remarks of Sen.
Dixon) (stating that "all futures contracts, regardless of the underlying commodity, must be traded
on federally approved exchanges"); Phillips, Viable and Safe Markets-The Role of the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission, Nat'l J., 1814, 1815 (Sept. 3, 1983) (stating that "federal law
prohibits the trading of futures contracts any place other than on a designated exchange").
54. See generally Curran, 456 U.S. at 358-59.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (1982); Revised Guidelines on Economic and Public Interest Requirements
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exchanges promulgate, administer, and enforce rules designed to ensure
honest markets and the integrity of their members. 6
Integrity is promoted in several ways. First, exchanges assure the
satisfaction of all financial obligations through financial safeguards,
which insure performance by market participants. Margin requirements
and daily marking-to-market help reduce the risk of nonperformance
by securing obligations to perform in the future and by adjusting the
margined amounts on a daily basis to conform with changing market
values. 57 Minimum capitalization requirements provide investors with
assurance that futures commission merchants (FCMs) will not default. 8
In the unlikely event of a default, fund segregation requirements insure
that proprietary FCM losses will not have an adverse impact on cus-
tomer capital. Similarly, clearing corporations, by taking an opposite
position on each trade, reduce the risk of performance default.5 9
The recent collapse of several government securities firms graphi-
cally illustrates the dangers created by the absence of such financial
protections. For example, the failure of ESM Government Securities led
to direct losses for a number of commercial firms, municipalities, and
savings and loan associations-all of whom were considered large and
sophisticated players in the market.6 0 Perhaps more distressing were
the widespread repercussions that the failure had on innocent third
parties. The loss of confidence in Home State Savings Bank of Cincin-
nati, a creditor of ESM, touched off a run on state insured institutions,
which ultimately led the Governor of Ohio to declare a bank holiday. 1
This crisis raised doubts about the stability of the entire United States
for Contract Market Designation, 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 6146 (Nov. 3, 1982).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982).
57. Futures contracts are not assets and do not have monetary value in the same sense as
securities. They give purchasers the right to profit from favorable market moves and the obligation
to pay as a result of unfavorable market moves. Futures margins secure the purchaser's obligation
to pay. Securities margins, on the other hand, act as down payments on the securities.
58. An FCM is an individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust "engaged in
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection with such solicitation or
acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu thereof)
to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts . . . therefrom." 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1987).
59. Irrespective of these measures, a massive off-exchange default could lead to a loss of
confidence in the markets for exchange-traded products. Such externalities demonstrate that ex-
changes have an interest in the conduct of off-exchange business over and above fears of unfair
competition. See Architzel & Tosini, A Framework For Current Issues Regarding Off-Exchange
Instruments, 7 COMMODITIES L. LETTeR, Apr. 1987, at 5.
60. See Brannigan, ESM Collapse Prompts S & P to Add 4 More Municipalities to Credit
Watch, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1985, at 10, col. 1; see also Closing of Ohio S & Ls After Run on
Deposits is One for the Books, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
61. See Brannigan, supra note 60; Closing of Ohio S & Ls After Run on Deposits is One for
the Books, supra note 60.
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banking system among foreign investors, producing a sudden drop in
the value of the dollar and a sharp rise in the price of precious metals.62
This rise in the price of precious metals, in turn, contributed to the
collapse of a futures exchange clearing firm when several of its custom-
ers-and ultimately the firm-could not satisfy margin calls on a large
number of short gold options." The failure temporarily dislocated the
financial affairs of numerous customers who had no connection to the
short gold option positions or ESM Government Securities. Thus, the
fraudulent activities of an off-exchange government securities firm con-
tributed to the serious financial distress inflicted upon innocent savings
and loan depositors and holders of regulated futures instruments.64
Exchanges do more than promote financial integrity. National and
international businesses rely on prices discovered on exchanges to re-
flect an equilibrium between supply and demand, not other artificial
factors.6 5 Self-interested traders monitor each other constantly and
serve as the first line of defense against manipulation. Exchanges moni-
tor the activities of their members and review market behavior regu-
larly for suspicious signs, interceding through disciplinary actions and
rule making. The CFTC also monitors trading, and its oversight is facil-
itated by the concentration of activity on an exchange in contrast to
widely dispersed trading among private firms and individuals in unli-
censed, nomadic shops, or on impersonal electronic trading systems.
Moreover, businesses rely on the prices discovered on the ex-
changes as being a reflection of the opinions and expectations of a
broad base of knowledgeable market participants. Market makers, each
with their own private information, bid on arriving orders, and their
collective information is incorporated into each changing price. Dilution
of trading caused by unreported private off-exchange trading would im-
62. O'Connor, Ohio's Banking Crisis, Prospects for Inflation Spark Gains in Prices, Wall St.
J., Mar. 19, 1985, § 2, at 46, col. 3.
63. Sullivan, Comex Member Firm's Collapse Affects 75 Investors, Broker, Other Exchanges,
Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1985, § 2, at 42, col. 3.
64. The example illustrates the weakness of the argument that commercial interests should
be free to transact in off-exchange instruments because the commercials can afford to assume the
risk that they will have to pay a penalty for bad business decisions or sloppy monitoring against
fraud. Today's interdependent markets increase the risk of a "snowballing" financial disaster and
no longer permit enclaves of unfettered and unregulated deal making. See infra notes 164-75 and
accompanying text; see also 2 P. ARCHrrzEL & P. ToSINI, A FRAMEWORK FOR CURRENT ISSUES RE-
GARDING OFF-EXCHANGE ISSUES 9 (Ninth Annual Commodities Law Institute 1986) (stating that
"there may be ripple effects in the economy at large from failure of firms in the off-exchange
environment"); Nash, Mending Financial Safety Net, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at D1, col. 3.
65. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (stating that "[t]he prices involved in [futures] transactions are
generally quoted and disseminated throughout the United States and in foreign countries as a
basis for determining the prices to the producer and the consumer of commodities and the prod-
ucts and byproducts thereof and to facilitate the movements thereof in interstate commerce"); see
also 120 CONG. REC. 30459 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
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pair the reliability of commodity prices. Further, by concentrating mar-
ket makers in a single area, exchange trading increases liquidity and
reduces the transaction costs of entering futures contracts, which makes
hedging less expensive. Lower middlemen costs benefit producers and
consumers. Thick markets also hinder attempted manipulations. In ad-
dition, well capitalized and competitive market makers enable hedgers
and speculators to execute large orders with virtually no delay. This
minimizes the risk that new information will affect prices adversely
before the orders are filled, or that the large orders themselves will
cause prices to either skyrocket or plummet.6
These public benefits are not available in a fragmented off-
exchange trading environment. Accordingly, the CEA renders it illegal
to transact in "a contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for
future delivery," unless the transaction is conducted on or subject to
the rules of a federally designated contract market.6 7 The statutory
evolution of this exchange-trading requirement supports the CFTC's
and the courts' broad application of the requirement. The requirement
is also supported by sound policy considerations. The next two sections
of the Article scrutinize the meaning of the requirement's key con-
cepts-"commodity" and "future delivery."
B. The Meaning of "Commodity" Under the CEA
Prior to 1974, "commodity" was a narrowly defined term under the
CEA, limited to those goods enumerated in the statute. In 1974 Con-
gress fundamentally altered the scope of the CEA by expanding the
definition to include additionally "all other goods and articles. . . and
all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery
are presently or in the future dealt in."68
The provision was designed to provide hedgers and investors in
"world commodity" futures with the same protection as hedgers and
investors in the enumerated commodities. 9 Congress reasoned that the
dangers of manipulation and the advantages of exchange trading ap-
plied equally to all commodities. 0 Moreover, Congress recognized the
need for an open-ended definition that would capture the emerging fu-
66. S. GROSSMAN & M. MILLER, THE DETERMINANTS OF MARKET LIQUIDITY (Working Paper
Feb. 1987).
67. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
68. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 201(b), 88
Stat. 1389, 1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(e) (1987).
69. The House Committee on Agriculture noted "that the implementation of this provision
would significantly increase public confidence in the futures market by providing the same protec-
tion to the unregulated commodity customers that is now afforded the regulated commodity cus-
tomers." H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974).
70. Id. at 41-42.
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tures markets in financial products and indices as well as innovative
products in non-traditional goods and services.7'
The CEA now considers all "goods and articles" to be commodities.
Furthermore, all "services, rights, and interests" underlying contracts
for future delivery also qualify as commodities. The "services, rights,
and interests" clause may be read literally to include services, rights,
and interests as commodities only if they underlie an exchange-traded
futures contract. This would imply that off-exchange futures trading in-
volving, for example, rights or interests in a stock index is permissible
so long as that index did not underlie an exchange-traded futures con-
tract. But, under CEA section 2(a)(1)(A), "services, rights, and inter-
ests" become commodities when they are traded in contracts for future
delivery, not when they are traded in contracts transacted on desig-
nated exchanges. Accordingly, a proper reading of the CEA would find
that all services, rights, and interests traded in contracts for future de-
livery-whether on- or off-exchange-are commodities.
Further, the literal approach should be rejected as were earlier
(pre-1982) arguments advocating a literal reading of sections 4 and 4h.
The allegedly literal readings are inconsistent with the CEA's general
concern with private exchanges and bucket shops and the explicit in-
tent of Congress to extend the protection of the CEA to buyers and
sellers of all futures contracts, whether on- or off-exchange, in enumer-
ated commodities or former world commodities. "Services, rights, and
interests" should be interpreted to advance the broad remedial pur-
poses of the CEA.72
C. The Meaning of "Future Delivery" Under the CEA
The term "future delivery" first appeared in the FTA, but its ori-
gin may be traced back to H.R. 2363, the 1921 bill that Congress even-
tually enacted in modified form as the FTA. The crux of the bill,
contained in section 4, proposed to levy a tax "upon each [bushel of
grain involved in a] contract of sale of grain for future delivery, except
...where the seller is at the time of the making of such contracts the
owner of the actual physical property covered thereby" ("the Owners/
Growers exemption")." A second clause removed the tax on contracts
for the sale of grain for future delivery "when made by or through a
member of a board of trade which had been designated by the Secre-
71. Id. See generally Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (7th Cir.),
vacated, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
72. See generally Architzel & Connolly, Delivery on Futures Contracts As a Legal Require-
ment, 36 Bus. LAw. 935, 936-39 (1981).
73. H.R. 2363, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1921).
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tary of Agriculture as a contract market. '74 Such designation was au-
thorized only when the board of trade agreed to comply with certain
requirements.75
The House Agriculture Committee held extensive hearings on the
bill. Near the end of those hearings, Secretary of Agriculture Henry C.
Wallace suggested adding the words "made at, on, or in an exchange,
board of trade or similar institution or place of business" after the
words "future delivery" and before the word "except," in the introduc-
tory clause to the section (the "Wallace Amendment").76 Mr. Wallace
explained that the proposed amendment sought merely to clarify that
the tax applied only to transactions for future delivery executed on ex-
changes. He cited as an example the sale of actual grain to an exporter
or foreign buyer by members of a cooperative selling agency whose
members had not yet planted the crop. Because the grain did not yet
exist, Wallace argued, the cooperative could not escape the prohibitive
tax through the Owners/Growers exemption because the exemption ap-
plied only if the seller owned the actual physical commodity at the time
the contract was made. 7 The cooperative could not escape the tax
through the second clause because the contract would not be executed
by or through a member of a designated contract market.78 By adding
the language restricting the tax to contracts made on exchanges, the
Secretary hoped to avoid the unintended taxation of a privately negoti-
ated forward contract used for merchandising purposes.79 When asked
whether such language would permit undesirable off-exchange specula-
tion, the Secretary responded that the intent was to permit unrestricted
contract making for future delivery of actual grain only. 0 Chester Mor-
rill, a staff member of the Department of Agriculture, later commented
that the additional wording was needed to avoid granting members of
boards of trade an unintended monopoly on futures and forward con-
tracts, both of which were literally contracts of sale for delivery of grain
in the future.81
74. Id. § 4(b).
75. Id. §5.
76. Future Trading: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
326 (1921) [hereinafter House Hearings on Future Trading]. The Wallace Amendment would have
caused § 4 to impose a tax "upon each [bushel of grain involved in a] contract of sale of grain for
future delivery made at, on, or in an exchange, board of trade or similar institution or place of
business, except where the seller is at the time of the making of such contracts the owner of the
actual physical property covered thereby." The language originated in the United States Cotton
Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 190, 39 Stat. 476 (1916).
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79. House Hearings on Future Trading, supra note 76, at 338.
80. Id. at 339.
81. Id. at 344.
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In the words of Mr. Morrill, the purpose of the amendment was to
avoid
the condition that any [person] who makes a contract which may be considered to
be for future delivery of grain outside of a board of trade must do it nevertheless
through a member of a board of trade, [giving] the members of boards of trade a
monopoly of future grain business.8
2
Mr. Morrill used the term "futures" loosely (and confusingly) to include
all future settling instruments. Contracts "of sale of grain for future
delivery" and "what is technically known as futures trading" were dis-
tinguished.83 The former encompassed exchange-traded futures as well
as forward merchandising contracts for cash that occurred both on- and
off-exchange. The latter was a technical term that encompassed the or-
ganized trading of standardized contracts that occurred (in 1921) only
on futures exchanges."' The Committee approved the Wallace Amend-
ment,s5 and the bill was passed by the full House and referred to the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. 6
The Senate Committee also held hearings, during which the Wal-
lace Amendment was extensively discussed. Mr. Morrill again explained
that the amendment was intended to make the tax
applicable to future trading as such, wherever it might be conducted, as distin-
guished from transactions which might be made for forward delivery or forward
shipment, such, for example, as an exporter might enter into obligating himself to
ship a certain amount of grain three months hence, which would be a transaction
for future delivery, but which the Secretary thought was not really intended to be
governed by this bill.8
7
He further explained that without the Wallace Amendment "the han-
dling of the cash grain business for future delivery [would be taken]
out of the hands of individuals and compel them to handle their busi-
ness through boards of trade."8 8
It was later pointed out, however, that while the amendment clari-
fied that the tax did not apply to cash transactions for deferred deliv-
ery, it did so in a way that could be construed to permit bucket shop
operations. Arguably, the Wallace Amendment created an incentive for
such operations by implying that grain for future delivery that was not
"made at, on, or in an exchange" could change hands tax-free. A wit-
ness before the Senate committee argued that the tax would unmistaka-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 345.
86. 61 CONG. REc. 1429 (1921).
87. Senate Hearings on Future Trading, supra note 23, at 9 (statement of Chester Morrill,
Assistant Chief of Bureau Markets, Department of Agriculture) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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bly apply to all futures transactions if the Wallace Amendment were
eliminated. The tax, he argued, would apply even to those transactions
consummated in off-exchange bucket shops, unless the transactions
were subject to the Owners/Growers exemption or unless they were exe-
cuted by a member of a designated contract market. He believed that
commercial transfers of actual grain would not be taxed when executed
off-exchange. 9
Another witness stated that the original bill "was simply [intended]
to affect the future transactions and not to interfere with the cash
grain" and that the Owners/Growers exemption freed all cash transac-
tions, including those for future delivery, from the tax.90 He argued that
the Wallace Amendment resulted from a misinterpretation of the Own-
ers/Growers exception and urged the removal of the amendment. He
thought that the Wallace Amendment invited con artists to make mar-
kets in tax-free off-exchange futures. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the
application of the tax to cash or spot grain transactions, he suggested
adding the following clause: "[tjhe words 'future delivery' shall not be
held to include any sales of cash grain for deferred shipment." 91
Thus, under this proposal all contracts for the sale of grain for fu-
ture delivery would be taxed, but future delivery did not include cash
sales for deferred shipment. "Cash grain" meant actual grain, empha-
sizing the merchandising nature of the exempt transactions.2 In this
way off-exchange bucket shops were outlawed and forward merchandis-
ing sales were exempted from the tax. Numerous other witnesses voiced
their approval of these proposed changes. 3 Even Mr. Wallace reluc-
tantly agreed that the changes might strengthen the bill.9 4
The Committee adopted the suggested changes by deleting the
Wallace Amendment and adding a provision which stated that "the
term 'future delivery', as used herein, shall not include any sale of cash
grain for deferred shipment" (the "forward contract exclusion"). 5 The
Senate report stated that the Wallace Amendment was
added by the House, it is understood, so that any grower or dealer who might sell
grain for deferred shipment would not be liable to the payment of the tax ....
However, with the addition of the [forward contract exclusion] this condition would
89. Id. at 193 (statement of F.M. Crosby, Director, Washburn-Crosby Co.).
90. Id. at 213-14 (statement of George T. McDermott, Kansas Grain Dealers Association).
91. Id. at 214.
92. Id. at 463. Senator Capper explained that the House inserted the Wallace Amendment
"on the assumption that unless those words were in, it would interfere with a man selling his own
grain .... If you want to be entirely sure that this bill does not effect such transactions, the
[forward contract exclusion] . . . will clear up that doubt." Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 270, 294, 354-55, 402-03, 431.
94. Id. at 462.
95. S. REP. No. 212, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921).
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not obtain. It is obvious also that if [the Wallace Amendment remains] in the bill
operations of private exchanges or bucket shops would be possible."
The forward contract exclusion was added "in order that transactions
in cash grain when made for deferred shipment or delivery would not
fall within the [taxing] provisions. 9 7 Senator Capper, sponsor of the
Senate version of the bill, explained to his colleagues that
the bill does not concern itself at all with the sale or purchase of actual grain,
either for present or future delivery. The entire business of buying and selling the
actual grain, sometimes called 'cash' or 'spot' business, is expressly excluded. It
deals only with the 'future' or 'pit' transaction in which the transfer of actual grain
is not contemplated.9 8
In conference, the House removed the Wallace Amendment. It also
agreed to the addition of the forward contract exclusion.9
After the Supreme Court struck down parts of the FTA as uncon-
stitutional, Congress quickly went to work to correct the cited defects.
No substantive changes were made in the proposed coverage of the
GFA.100 The Owners/Growers exemption was adopted verbatim.10 1 The
GFA also kept intact the language of the forward contract exclusion,
"confirming the notion that a cash forward contract is one in which the
parties contemplated physical transfer of the actual commodity."10
Legislation to amend the GFA by eliminating the Owners/Growers
exemption appeared in 1934 with H.R. 9623.103 The bill was reintro-
duced in 1936 as H.R. 6772 in essentially the same form.0 " The amend-
ment was
intended to clarify section 4 of the [GFA] by striking therefrom an unnecessary
exception. Section 4 of that act makes it unlawful to contract for grain for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any board of trade unless such board of trade
has been designated as a contract market and such contract is evidenced by a rec-
ord in writing. The [Owners/Growers] exception . . . which is stricken by the bill
purports to except contracts where the seller is "the owner of the actual physical
property covered thereby, or is the grower thereof, or in case either party to the
contract is the owner or renter of land on which the same is to be grown," etc. The
exception is confusing and is unnecessary for two reasons: (1) Section 4 of the act is
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 61 CONG. REc. 4762 (1921) (remarks of Sen. Capper) (emphasis added).
99. The House altered the exclusion by adding the words "or delivery" after "shipment."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 362, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1921).
100. Grain Futures Act: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 67th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1922).
101. Compare Grain Futures Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-331, § 4, 42 Stat. 998, 999-1000 with
Futures Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 4, 42 Stat. 187.
102. NRT Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,931, at 28,018 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1983); see also Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
103. H.R. 9623, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1934).
104. H.R. 6772, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1936).
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limited expressly to contracts for the sale of grain "for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any board of trade in the United States," and (2) the term "future
delivery" is defined in section 2 of the act so as "not to include any cash grain for
deferred shipment or delivery. '
The bill was enacted as the CEA, and thereafter only sales of cash
grain for deferred shipment or delivery were excused from the ex-
change-trading requirement.10 6 In general,
Congress reaffirmed and refined the essential statutory distinction it had first made
in 1921 between those kinds of contracts for future delivery that it intended either
to prohibit or regulate-contracts offered by persons conducting a business in con-
tracts for the future delivery of commodities-and those contracts that it did not
intend to regulate or prohibit-cash sale contracts contemplating actual, although
deferred, delivery.1 0 7
The CFTC also has interpreted the forward contract exclusion nar-
rowly, concluding that the "exclusion was intended to cover only con-
tracts for sale which are entered into with the expectation that delivery
of the actual commodity will eventually occur through performance on
the contracts."'0 3 Forward contracts entail "not only the legal obligation
to perform, but also the generally fulfilled expectation that the contract
will lead to the exchange of commodities for money." 0 9 More recently,
the CFTC has recognized that forward contracts are "commercial, mer-
chandising transactions in physical commodities in which delivery actu-
ally occurs but is delayed or deferred for commercial purposes.""'
105. H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1935).
106. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 4, 49 Stat. 1491, 1492 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982)).
107. Regulation of Leverage Transactions as Contracts for Future Delivery or Otherwise,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,772, at 23,169 (C.F.T.C., Mar. 12,
1978) (Exhibit I) (emphasis added). The exhibit attached to the leverage memorandum also con-
cludes that "[tihe only category of off-exchange future-delivery contracts that are permitted is the
class of commercially motivated cash commodity sales, which contemplate actual delivery of the
commodity, but in which delivery may be deferred for purposes of commercial convenience or
necessity." Id. at 23,164; see also 1 T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODrrias FUTURES AND
OPTIONS MARKETS 9-13 (1983); Gerstell, supra note 3, at 3.
108. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,941, at
23,777 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 6, 1979).
109. Id. at 23,778; see also In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,698, at 30,976 (C.F.T.C., Aug. 7, 1985) (stating that futures con-
tracts provide "participants with an opportunity to assume or shift the risk of price changes in an
underlying commodity without the forced burden of delivery"), rev'g [1982-1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) % 21,707, at 26,779-80 (C.F.T.C., Apr. 29, 1983) (stating that "[t]he
legislative history indicates that the exclusion for deferred delivery contracts is a very narrow one,
intended to meet a particular need, such as that of a farmer to sell part of next season's harvest at
a set price to a grain elevator or miller.. . . Consonant with the narrowness of this exclusion is
Congress' intention that this exclusion not apply to contracts entered into for speculative
purposes").
110. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,995,
at 34,492 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 11, 1987). The Office of the General Counsel to the CFTC (OGC) has
noted that "because forward contracts are commercial, merchandising transactions which result in
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The Ninth Circuit has critically examined the underlying purposes
of challenged transactions in holding that the exclusion "is unavailable
to contracts of sale for commodities which are sold merely for specula-
tive purposes and which are not predicated upon the expectation that
delivery of the actual commodity by the seller to the original con-
tracting buyer will occur in the future.""'1 Other courts have reached
the same conclusion. 12
In summary, neither the CFTC nor the courts have had difficulty
applying the "intent to deliver" criterion for distinguishing between fu-
tures and forwards. Legislative history demonstrates a congressional in-
tent to regulate futures contracts. Congress intended to excuse from the
otherwise plenary reach of the exchange-trading requirement only a
very narrow class of future-settling contracts that contemplate the
transfer of actual ownership of a commodity in a commercial, merchan-
dising transaction. Congress apparently concluded that cash deferred
contracts, which contemplate the transfer of actual ownership of a com-
modity, could not be used to manipulate prices. Conversely, future-
settling contracts that did not contemplate actual delivery, regardless of
the nature of the parties involved, posed a sufficient threat to require
that they be traded only on monitored exchanges.
V. THE TREASURY AMENDMENT
Congress added the so-called Treasury Amendment to the CEA in
1974 as part of a major revision of federal commodities regulation. The
amendment states that the CEA shall not apply "to transactions in"
foreign currencies, government securities and other enumerated finan-
cial instruments "unless such transactions involve the sale [of such in-
delivery,. . . the Commission [looks] for evidence of the transactions' use in commerce." Charac-
teristics Distinguishing Cash and Forward Contracts and "Trade" Options, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,718, at 31,026-27 (C.F.T.C., Sept. 30, 1985). The CFTC
views "expectation of delivery" as a legal element in actions it brings alleging violations of CEA
§ 4(a). Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. James Timpson & Assoc., No. 86-1342T (S.D.
Cal. June 18, 1986) (paragraph 19 of complaint alleging violations of CEA § 4(a)) (stating that
"[b]y these and similar representations, customers who purchased ... contracts did not have the
expectation that they would be required to take delivery of the metals which are the subjects of
the contracts").
111. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 579
(9th Cir. 1982).
112. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., [1980-1982
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,086, at 24,380 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 1980) (stating
that "[tihe exclusion was intended to apply only to those contracts for sale which are predicated
upon the expectation that delivery of the actual commodity by the seller will in fact occur"); NRT
Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 21,931, at 28,018 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1983) (stating that "[t]he exemption clearly encompassed
only those contracts which promised the actual delivery of grain at a specified time in the future").
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struments] for future delivery conducted on a board of trade." '
The 1974 legislation originally did not include the Treasury
Amendment. There was concern, however, that the new and expanded
definition of "commodity" would encompass interbank forward market
trading in foreign currencies, and therefore subject such transactions to
terms of the CEA. During the Senate hearings, the representative of a
major bank complained that a number of the proposed provisions "ap-
pear particularly troublesome and burdensome if they are construed as
applying to foreign exchange transactions of the kind executed in the
interbank market."1 '11 He described the market as "designed to service
customers of the bank who have a commercial need to buy and sell for-
eign exchange."' 15 The concerns expressed by the witness are misplaced
because the described transactions have many of the characteristics of
instruments already beyond the reach of the CEA such as cash trades
or commercial merchandising forward trades. Even today, the over-
whelming majority of all interbank transactions are in cash (with for-
wards comprising a smaller percentage of transactions).1 6
Nevertheless, after the hearings (but before final mark-up began)
the Treasury Department sent the chairman of the Senate Agriculture
and Forestry Committee a letter reiterating many of the concerns previ-
ously expressed by the major bank. The letter noted that the proposed
expansion of the definition of "commodity" would include foreign cur-
rencies and that "futures" trading in foreign currencies would therefore
be subject to regulation under the CEA.117 The letter also stated that
the proposed legislation did not "clearly indicate that the new regula-
113. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
114. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 772 (1974).
115. Id. at 771. The Comptroller of the Currency later described the interbank market of the
period as involving cash and forward contracts. He failed to mention the presence of any futures
trading. See also infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing April 11, 1986 letter from
the Comptroller of the Currency to the C.F.T.C.).
116. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FuTuREs REGULATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, THE EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY TRADING 4
(Working Paper 1987); FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF U.S. FOR-
EIGN EXCHANGE MARKET TURNOVER SURVEY CONDUCTED IN MARCH 1986 (Aug. 20, 1986); Andrews,
Recent Trends in the U.S. Foreign Exchange Market, 9 FED. RESERVE BOARD N.Y. Q. REV. 38
(1984); Revey, Evolution and Growth of the United States Foreign Exchange Market, 6 FED. RE-
SERVE BOARD N.Y. Q. REV. 32 (1981).
117. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1974). The Treasury Department seemingly
was groping for the same accommodation between regulation of "futures" and nonregulation of
"forwards" that caused Secretary of Agriculture Wallace to propose his amendment in 1921. Like
Secretary Wallace, the Treasury Department may have intended to use the word "futures" broadly
to mean executory contracts for the purchase or sale of commodities, regardless of whether the
contracts were true futures or commercial merchandising transactions for cash but deferred
delivery.
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tory agency's authority would be limited to the regulation of futures
trading on organized exchanges, and would not extend to futures trad-
ing in foreign currencies off organized exchanges."' l
Regulation of "foreign currency futures trading of banks or other
institutions, other than on an organized exchange" was deemed unnec-
essary and ill-advised for several reasons. First, the Treasury Depart-
ment, while acknowledging that "other institutions" sometimes traded
currency "futures," explained that virtually all such trading took place
through an informal network of banks and dealers who were sophisti-
cated and informed, unlike many of the public participants in desig-
nated contract markets. 1 9 Second, the Treasury Department indicated
that the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve already
were "taking action to achieve closer supervision of the trading risks
involved in [futures trading]."'120 Finally, Treasury feared that limiting
futures trading in currencies to exchanges "could have an adverse im-
pact on the usefulness and efficiency of foreign exchange markets."'' It
concluded that regulation of transactions in security warrants, security
rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, govern-
ment securities, mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, or in
puts and calls for securities, "which generally are between large, sophis-
ticated institutional participants, is unnecessary, and could be
harmful.' 12 12
The Senate Committee adopted the Treasury Amendment, using
the language recommended by the Treasury Department.123 The
amendment as adopted, however, did not include puts and calls on se-
curities among the list of excluded financial instruments. 2" In its expla-
nation of the amendment, the Senate Report "clarified" that
"interbank trading of foreign currencies and specified financial instru-
ments is not subject to Commission regulation."'12 The report later
stated that "[a] great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the
United States is carried out through an informal network of banks and
tellers" that "is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory agen-
cies." ' 28 The Committee found it unnecessary to regulate the other fi-
nancial instruments enumerated in the amendment because these
instruments "generally are between banks and other sophisticated insti-
118. Id. at 49.
119. Id. at 50.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 51.
123. Id. at 54-55.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 23.
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tutional participants.1127 In contrast to the Treasury Department's re-
peated references to interbank "futures" trading, the Committee
refrained pointedly from describing transactions affected by the amend-
ment as "futures."'1 28 The Conference Committee later accepted the
Senate's amendment, similarly refraining from any references to
"futures."129
For numerous reasons the scope of the Treasury Amendment
should be limited to forward contracts. The plain language of the
amendment indicates that only cash and forward trading are excluded
from the exchange-trading requirement. 130 By its terms, the amend-
ment applies only to "transactions in" the listed commodities, unless
the transactions "involve the sale [of such commodities] for future de-
livery."'' Futures (and options) trading, however, takes place, not in
commodities, but in executory contract rights to purchase and sell cash
commodities at a later date. Such trading consists of
formation of contracts for later sale of a commodity. No commodity is sold when a
futures contract is formed; futures transactions are transactions in rights to the
commodity rather than in the commodity itself.. . . [T]he futures contract market
may be viewed as a forum for dealing in contracts to make a contract, or contracts
to make a later sale.1
32
Thus, a futures (or option) contract is not a transaction in a commod-
ity, but at most is a transaction involving commodities (i.e., carrying
the potential for their later purchase or sale).' 33 -Numerous decisions
127. Id.
128. Compare the Department of Treasury's description of an "ambiguity" in the bill,
namely that its provisions "do not clearly indicate that the new regulatory agency's authority
would be limited to the regulation of futures trading on organized exchanges, and would not ex-
tend to futures trading in foreign currencies off organized exchanges," id. at 49 (emphasis added),
with the Committee's statement that the "amendment provides that inter-bank trading [and not
futures trading] of foreign currencies ... is not subject to Commission regulation." Id. at 6.
129. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).
130. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (stating that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be deemed to govern or
in any way be applicable to transactions in [certain financial instruments]" (emphasis added)).
131. Id.
132. Clark, Geneology and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Deliv-
ery" in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMoRY L.J. 1175, 1175-76 (1978) (emphasis in original,
footnotes omitted).
133. Evidence of congressional sensitivity to the notion that futures contracts involve com-
modities can be found in § 3 of the CEA (originally enacted as part of the GFA in 1922). That
provision, which discusses the need for regulation of futures markets, begins with a finding that
"[t]ransactions in commodities involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly con-
ducted on boards of trade and known as 'futures' are affected with a national public interest." 7
U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (emphasis added).
Further evidence is found in the FTA, which imposed a prohibitive tax on each bushel of grain
"involved" in options transactions and "involved" in sales for future delivery (unless executed on a
contract market). The following exchange on the floor of the House demonstrates that Congress
carefully considered the meaning of the word "involved" when it drafted the FTA:
Mr. Cooper: I notice ... there is levied a tax of 20 cents a bushel on every bushel involved in
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have recognized this distinction.""
The wording of the amendment's "escape" provision-that the
CEA shall not apply to transactions in the enumerated financial instru-
ments "unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future de-
livery conducted on a board of trade' 3 5-lends further support that
the Amendment does not reach futures trading because futures con-
tracts are not "transactions in" commodities. The purpose of the escape
provision
is not to except . . . futures from the Treasury Amendment. Rather, the "unless"
clause is needed (and was enacted) to except the transactions in security rights, etc.
that occur when a futures contract is actually performed . . . .The futures ...
contract is not a transaction in a commodity but insofar as it may presage some
future transfer of the commodity, the latter is excepted from the Treasury Amend-
ment by the "unless" clause.13
In other words, the escape provision was adopted to insure that the
Treasury Amendment did not apply and that CFTC jurisdiction did ex-
tend to cash market transactions-i.e., to "transactions in" the financial
instruments-necessary to consummate actual delivery on exchange-
trade futures contracts.
[futures] transactions. There is no "bushel" involved.
Mr. Purnell: Only mathematically.
Mr. Cooper: There is no bushel of grain involved. Suppose they would say technically that
there was no grain involved in it?
Mr. Purnell: Certainly the intent of the law is to tax every bushel of grain that is involved,
either actually or theoretically. In other words, if a man buys in a speculative way, with no
intention of having it delivered, 50,000,000 bushels or 1 bushel, he must pay the tax.
61 CONG. REc. 1320 (1921) (remarks of Reps. Cooper and Purnell).
More recently, Congress enacted a bill regulating the cash market for government securities
(instruments included within the reach of the Treasury Amendment). The act contained con-
forming amendments that, among other things, added definitions to § 3(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The new definitions for "government securities broker" and "government
securities dealer" exclude certain persons and entities that "effect[] transactions in government
securities." Government Securities Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-571, § 102(d), 100 Stat. 3208, 3217
(1986) (emphasis added) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(43)(44) (Supp. IV 1986). The language is
consistent with congressional awareness that cash transaction are in commodities.
Read together, these statutes demonstrate that Congress long ago discovered that futures (and
option) transactions involve commodities and that cash and forward transactions are in
commodities.
134. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242,
1248-49 (2d Cir. 1986); Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1154 (7th Cir. 1982);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade, 473 F. Supp. 1177, 1182-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 21,169, at 24,783-84 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1981). The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission as well has adopted the position that options transactions "involve,"
but are not transactions "in," commodities. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee C.F.T.C. at 26-28,
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. American Bd. of Trade (Nos. 81-6240, 85-6134, and 85-
6388).
135. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
136. Board of Trade of Chicago, 677 F.2d at 1154 n.33 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Congress noted expressly that the amendment merely
"clarified" existing law. Stich a characterization makes sense if the
amendment makes clear that cash and forward transactions in the enu-
merated financial instruments are not regulated under the CEA, a re-
sult implicit in the forward contract exclusion. Clarification, however,
hardly would be an appropriate description of congressional action in-
tended to deviate from the CEA's longstanding policy of restricting the
trading of commodities for future delivery to designated exchanges. The
absence of any reference in the amendment's legislative history to fu-
tures transactions further indicates a congressional intent to restrict the
provision's application to cash and forward transactions.
A broad reading of the amendment permits bucket shops as well as
banks to trade futures outside the CEA. This result contravenes a cen-
tral feature of the 1974 amendments-bringing all previously unregu-
lated futures within the CEA's umbrella-and is particularly
unreasonable, since Congress in 1974 was trying to stamp out rampant
abuses in the off-exchange sale of naked options.
The Treasury Amendment has been interpreted consistently as re-
moving only cash and forward transactions in the enumerated financial
instruments from the jurisdiction of the CFTC.1 37 CFTC staff first con-
sidered the amendment in a published letter to the SEC chairman, stat-
ing that the amendment
was intended to make clear that the CFTC would not have any jurisdiction with
respect to the purchase and sale of the enumerated financial instruments them-
selves (the "cash market"), but would have jurisdiction solely with respect to fu-
tures trading in those instruments. Absent such a provision, various sections of the
[CEA] would have given the CFTC jurisdiction over cash market manipulation of
financial instruments for which a futures contract market had been designated.138
Two years later, the OGC interpreted the amendment
as an expression that regulation by the Commission is unnecessary where there
exists an informal market among institutional participants in transactions for fu-
ture delivery in the specified financial instruments only so long as it is supervised
by those agencies having regulatory responsibility over those participants. How-
ever, where that market is not supervised and where those transactions are con-
ducted with participation by members of the general public, we do not understand
the Committee to have intended that a regulatory gap should exist. In these cir-
cumstances, we believe the Commodity Exchange Act should be construed broadly
to assure that the public interest will be protected by Commission regulation of
those transactions. 139
137. Cf. Abrams v. Oppenheimer Gov't Sec., Inc. 737 F.2d 582, 590 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating
that "[t]he legislative history behind the 1974 amendment indicates the Treasury Department was
concerned that the CFTC might exceed its jurisdiction in regulating financial instruments such as
GNMA forwards which are not traded on an organized exchange" (emphasis added)).
138. SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Correspondence, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,117, at 20,834 (C.F.T.C. Staff Response, Dec. 3, 1975).
139. CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 77-12 (Dealers in GNMA Certificates as Board of
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Reference to market supervision by regulatory agencies other than the
CFTC did not create an exception to the exchange-trading requirement;
rather, it was intended to justify the limiting of cash and forward mar-
ket jurisdiction in the enumerated markets that were regulated by other
agencies.
The CFTC most recently considered the Treasury Amendment in a
1985 statutory interpretation and request for comments. It explained
that the amendment "excludes from the Commission's exclusive juris-
diction over futures contracts certain off-exchange transactions in for-
eign currencies and other enumerated financial instruments" and
"applies only when such transactions are entered into by and between
banks and certain other sophisticated and informed institutional par-
ticipants. '140 The marketing of futures transactions in foreign curren-
cies "to the general public . . . is strictly outside the scope of the
Amendment."1'4 The 1985 statutory interpretation concluded with a re-
quest for comments and information. 142
The CFTC received many responses to its request for comments,
including letters from the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and the Treasury Department. The Federal Reserve prefaced its
comments by stating that it understood "the CFTC does not . . in-
tend to interfere with legitimate transactions by banks and other regu-
lated dealers, recognizing that at a minimum such transactions are
excluded from the CFTC's jurisdiction by the . . . Treasury Amend-
ment.' ' 143 This prefatory statement is correct to the extent that "legiti-
mate transactions" are meant to include cash and forward transactions.
The Federal Reserve went on to note that the off-exchange market
"has contributed to the liquidity, resiliency, and efficiency of the ex-
change market.' 44 It also recommended that the interbank market re-
Trade), [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,467, at 21,912 (O.G.C. Aug.
17, 1977).
140. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,984 (Oct. 23, 1985).
141. Id. at 42,985.
142. Id. Recent amendments to the CEA that ban leverage contracts in foreign curren-
cies-contracts closely resembling futures contracts-tend to confirm the CFTC's opinion that
Congress has not authorized the sale of foreign currency futures to the public. See Futures Trading
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, § 109, 100 Stat. 3556, 3560 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 23 (Supp. IV
1986)).
143. Letter from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFTC (Mar. 5, 1986).
144. Id. No doubt some off-exchange trades later result in a party covering itself through
exchange trades. But to justify off-exchange trading of futures by pointing to secondary use of
organized futures markets misses the point. Congress determined as a policy matter that the ad-
vantages of centralized exchange trading of futures contracts outweighed disadvantages of limiting
trading in over-the-counter futures. It is disingenuous to argue that illegal off-exchange markets
should be condoned because they produce marginal benefits for legal markets because even com-
pelling policy arguments cannot of themselves repeal a statute. Presumably policy was considered
and a balance struck when the forward contract exclusion and the Treasury Amendment were
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main open to otherwise unsuitable participants (i.e., members of the
public) whenever designated exchanges could not provide these partici-
pants with the amount or type of currency needed for commercial or
investment purposes, and when the participants or the transactions met
other exemptive criteria (generally related to the size of the transac-
tions and the sophistication of the participants).145
This unacceptable approach completely ignores the exchange-trad-
ing requirement. The CEA focuses on the nature of the transaction, re-
quiring that all contracts for the purchase or sale of commodities for
future delivery be executed on designated exchanges; it supplies no ex-
emption or special solicitude for size or sophistication or the absence of
exchange-traded alternatives. Indeed, given the public harm caused by
the various failures of large and sophisticated, but unregulated, govern-
ment securities traders, arguably the risk to the public from unfettered
trading increases with size. Allowing exceptions to the exchange-trading
requirement erodes the advantages of exchange trading and materially
heightens the danger of manipulation and disruptive bankruptcies.
These dangers could have potentially disastrous and far reaching conse-
quences for innocent third parties.
Admittedly, these risks diminish to the extent other federal agen-
cies monitor interbank futures trading. But currently no federal agen-
cies monitor this trading. Non-CFTC regulators place no substantive
restrictions on the volume, type, or structure of interbank transactions.
Nor do these regulators promulgate regulations that specifically address
the dangers associated with futures trading. Interbank transactions
need not be reported, which apparently accounts for the lack of any
reliable estimates on even the size of the market. Banks have absolute
discretion over whether, and with whom, they choose to do business.
Credit concerns are private contractual matters left to the parties.
Prices of consummated transactions are not reported. While regulators
scrutinize bank records to insure compliance with various substantive
restrictions (such as general capital requirements), they monitor "fu-
tures" trading only incidentally. Banks that trade foreign currency may
be regulated, but their regulators do not enforce the CEA, CFTC regu-
lations, or exchange rules, nor do the regulators act to promote the
goals underlying the CEA.4 6 Moreover, a significant amount of cur-
drafted. While critics can disagree with that balance, it is for Congress alone to alter. Further, it is
unclear as an empirical matter the extent to which off-exchange transactions benefit exchange
trading.
145. Id.
146. The Fed began distributing a monthly FOREX survey to major banks in the 1970s. The
survey requests general information about the size and types of transactions entered the previous
month, and is used to gauge overall market size and the relative activity in different instrument
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rency trading is conducted by nonbank brokers who operate without
substantive regulatory oversight.14
The Comptroller of the Currency also responded to the CFTC's re-
quest for information and described the foreign exchange market of the
mid-1970s. The Comptroller explained that commercial banks entered
transactions "for their own account and for the accounts of customers
who had legitimate business needs to buy or sell foreign currencies for
forward settlement.'' 48 A few of the customers were individuals "fi-
nancing their business affairs through the bank executing the forward
[foreign exchange] transactions."'49 These comments confirm that the
concern in 1974 was that the CFTC would exercise jurisdiction over in-
terbank cash and forward transactions. The Comptroller also indicated
that he had received no consumer complaints within the past two years
regarding foreign exchange transactions with national banks, which im-
plied that the concerns of rampant fraud were unfounded.1 50
The Treasury Department sent the last-and most surpris-
ing-letter.1 5 ' It began by expressing the concern that any interpreta-
tion of the Treasury Amendment which permitted the CFTC to
exercise jurisdiction over the interbank market would logically apply to
the market for government securities as well-instruments included in
the amendment and an area over which Treasury was seeking exclusive
jurisdiction. 15 2 It concluded by recommending modification of the Trea-
sury Amendment to create CFTC jurisdiction over public interbank
currency trading provided that such an amendment would not impair
"legitimate hedging transactions."'153 Treasury apparently misread the
amendment to remove any kind of trading-including futures trad-
ing-from the reach of the CEA, instead of reading the plain language
of the amendment to apply only to "transactions in" the listed financial
types and currencies. It also solicits a limited amount of information about the nature of the
counterparties. Compliance is voluntary. The Fed also has a Foreign Exchange Committee that
issues an annual report. The report contains various recommendations on how to deal with recur-
ring industry problems. While these recommendations are generally followed, compliance is volun-
tary. Last, the 1980 Guidelines issued by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
recite prudent accounting standards but have a force and effect no greater than the annual report.
Failure of the CFTC to exercise its jurisdiction over futures trading in the interbank market would
create the kind of regulatory gap Congress hoped to prevent.
147. See R. KUBARYCH, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 13-15 (1983).
148. Letter from the Comptroller of the Currency to the CFTC (Apr. 11, 1986) (emphasis
added).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Letter from the Department of Treasury to the CFTC (May 5, 1986).
152. Id. Congress recently passed a bill giving the Treasury rule making authority over the
market in government securities. Government Securities Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat.
3208 (1986) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)).
153. Letter from the Department of Treasury to CFTC (May 5, 1986).
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instruments (i.e., cash and forward transactions).
As a result of these and other submissions, the CFTC has deferred
issuance of a definitive interpretation of the Treasury Amendment.'
But its silence should not be interpreted as a shift from its longstanding
view that the amendment applies only to cash and forward transactions
in the enumerated financial instruments. This view is supported by the
unequivocal language of the amendment, its legislative history, recent
case law vindicating CFTC enforcement actions, and the fundamental
structure of futures regulation in the United States which requires that
all futures be traded on designated exchanges.
VI. CFTC EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
The CEA amendments, which the House passed in 1974, provided
that the jurisdiction of the CFTC "shall be exclusive with respect to
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future deliv-
ery which are traded or executed on a domestic board of trade or con-
tract market or any other board of trade, exchange or market."'155 The
House Report clearly stated that CFTC jurisdiction extended to "all
futures transactions and all cash transactions related thereto.' 56 This
jurisdiction extended to such transactions when executed on "not only
domestic boards of trade but also 'on any other board of trade, ex-
change, or market,' ,,157 indicating that the CFTC would have exclusive
jurisdiction over futures executed on foreign exchanges as well as those
illegally executed off-exchange.
The Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry added lan-
guage stating that the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction "includes the regu-
lation of commodity accounts, commodity trading agreements, and
commodity options.' 5 The Committee also limited the CFTC's juris-
diction to futures contracts "traded or executed on a contract market
designated pursuant to section 5 of this Act," eliminating the words "or
any other board of trade, exchange, or market.' 59 This change appar-
ently was intended as an expression of Senate disapproval of exclusive
CFTC jurisdiction over transactions on foreign exchanges. 160 The Sen-
ate passed the bill following the addition of a clause which stated that
154. Gerstell, supra note 3, at 6.
155. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., as passed by the House and referred to the Senate
Agriculture and Forestry Committee (Apr. 22, 1974).
156. H. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1974); see also 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
157. H. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 8.
158. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
159. H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., as reported by the Senate Agriculture and Forestry
Committee (Aug. 29, 1974).
160. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974) (stating that the CFTC will have exclu-
sive jurisdiction "over all futures transactions which are executed on domestic boards of trade").
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the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over leverage contracts."'
The conference committee accepted the "clarifying" Senate
changes, although it also restored the extension of jurisdiction proposed
by the House. Therefore, jurisdiction was extended to futures instru-
ments bought and sold in the United States (but executed on a foreign
exchange) by reinserting the phrase "on any other board of trade, ex-
change, or market."162 Congress further amended the CEA in 1982 to
resolve a jurisdictional dispute between the CFTC and SEC, but noth-
ing in the legislative history of that or any subsequent amendment indi-
cates an intent to limit CFTC jurisdiction over futures contracts. 6 '
VII. THE SAFE HARBOR PROPOSAL
The CFTC, in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, has sug-
gested the creation of a "safe harbor" from its supervisory jurisdiction
for certain commercial transactions."" The advance notice advocates
the creation of a no-action procedure for executory transactions that do
not result in physical delivery of a commodity, provided that the trans-
actions are entered by commercial merchandisers for non-speculative
purposes and further provided that the transactions satisfy all of the
other requirements of the forward contract exclusion.165
In making its proposal, the CFTC recognized that
[w]hile the infrequency of delivery of the commodity in such transactions would
tend to preclude their characterization as forward contracts within the [CEA's] ju-
risdictional exclusion, such transactions nonetheless appear to be essentially pri-
vate, commercial transactions that generally involve the exchange of interests in an
actual physical commodity. As such, while beyond the established definition of for-
ward contracts, such transactions may be suitable for a [CFTC] no-action position
to the extent that they occur other than on a designated contract market.1 6
161. 120 CONG. REc. 30,468 (1974).
162. Cf. id. 34,737 (remarks of Representative Poage) (stating that "[t]he words 'any other
board of trade, exchange or market' were included in the conference substitute only for the pur-
pose of giving the [CFTC] jurisdiction over futures contracts purchased and sold in the United
States and executed on a foreign board of trade, exchange or market").
163. The CFTC has rejected the argument that its jurisdiction extends to futures contracts
only if they are transacted on or through the facilities of an exchange. Quoting the Administrative
Law Judge who first addressed the argument, the CFTC noted that "the requirement that a fu-
tures contract be executed on a designated contract market is what makes the contract legal and
not what makes it a futures contract." In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,779 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 6, 1979) (emphasis in original).
164. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 23,995
(C.F.T.C., Dec. 11, 1987). A committee of the New York Bar had made a similar suggestion previ-
ously. The Forward Contract Exclusion: An Analysis of Off-Exchange Commodity-Based Instru-
ments, 41 Bus. LAW. 853, 855 (1986).
165. Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,995,
at 34,491-34,494 (C.F.T.C., Dec. 11, 1987).
166. Id. at 34,492 (emphasis added).
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The CFTC proposal would be limited to direct transactions between
commercial counterparties (i.e., transactions that occur without the ser-
vices of dealers, market-makers, or other third parties) entered incident
to their routine course of business rather than for speculative or invest-
ment purposes.167 In addition, the instruments involved could not be
transferred.16 The CFTC also suggested a no-action procedure for an-
other class of transactions involving intangible "services, rights and in-
terests" not easily susceptible to physical delivery, such as instruments
in which returns are tied to variable-rate indices or to the performance
of baskets of commodities.6 9
This approach departs from the CEA's focus on the nature of the
transaction rather than the nature of the participant, and finds no sup-
port in the language of the CEA, its legislative history, or court and
CFTC interpretations. 170 Furthermore, it threatens to remove from
CFTC supervision transactions likely to cause public harm.'11 Congress
determined that unbridled speculation fostered manipulation that was
detrimental to the public's interest. To better manage this threat, Con-
gress confined all transactions involving the purchase or sale of com-
modities for future delivery to licensed exchanges. Congress excluded
commercial merchandising transactions that contemplate delivery of ac-
tual commodities ("forward contracts") from its definition of "future
delivery." Apparently, the theory underlying this definition was that
such transactions do not raise the specter of manipulation. While all
such forward contracts are (by definition) commercial in nature, not all
transactions by commercial parties are forwards. This is largely because
not all transactions by commercial parties contemplate delivery.
The CFTC's position is objectionable for many reasons. The most
compelling reason is that this position implies that the CFTC can ig-
nore its congressional grant of jurisdiction and concomitant obligation
to prohibit off-exchange futures whenever, in its opinion, the advan-
tages of off-exchange futures trading outweigh its disadvantages. The
CEA simply does not give the CFTC such discretion. 7 2 Further, the
167. Id. at 34,493.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 34,493-34,494.
170. Congress recognized the need to regulate futures markets after concluding that both the
public and commercial parties participate in futures markets. 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (stating that
"[flutures transactions are carried on in large volume by the public generally and by persons en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling commodities and the products and byproducts thereof
in interstate commerce").
171. See Architzel & Tosini, supra note 59, at 3 (warning that the benefits of off-exchange
trading between commercial entities come at a cost).
172. See 132 CONG. REC. S13587 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Lugar) (stating
that "[u]ltimately, the decision whether to alter the statute [to accommodate off-exchange instru-
ments] rests with Congress, and only with Congress").
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CFTC's narrow focus on commercial participation is misplaced. The
mere absence of public participation does not insulate a transaction
from the CEA or its exchange-trading requirement. Commercial parties
often speculate, as well as hedge, and therefore the dangers of manipu-
lation remain. While the CFTC is on target with its attempts to limit
the availability of the no-action procedure to non-speculative transac-
tions, it creates no mechanism to monitor compliance. The temptation
for commercial parties to offset positions as market expectations change
over time may be too tempting to resist, even when transactions are
entered originally for legitimate commercial reasons.' The CEA cre-
ates no exceptions for size or sophistication, recognizing that any-
one-including commercials-can speculate excessively. 174 The wisdom
of this broad approach has been demonstrated by the recent failures of
several unregulated government securities firms, whose off-exchange
trading of unregulated financial instruments has led to serious public
harm.
175
173. Cf. Grant, Why Treasurers are Swapping Swaps, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1985, at 19 (discuss-
ing how corporate treasurers are increasingly offsetting profitable swap positions entered originally
as hedges).
174. Cf. House Hearings on Future Trading, supra note 76, at 7-8.
175. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
The demand for a safe harbor first found sympathetic ears in the OGC of the CTFC, which
issued a cryptic no-action letter relating to an export trading company's proposed sale of certain
future-settling commodity sales contracts. Seventy-five percent of the anticipated transactions
were expected to involve commodities similar or identical to those traded on exchanges. All con-
tracts were expected to settle in cash, and actual delivery could never take place.
OGC predicated its no-action position on the company's representations that the contracts
would be marketed to commercial customers and not to the public. It further conditioned its posi-
tion on the approval of the plan by the Federal Reserve Board-the agency that OGC expected to
monitor the company.
OGC did not specify whether it found the proposed instruments beyond the scope of its juris-
diction or whether it was simply declining to exercise jurisdiction. In the opinion of one commenta-
tor, OGC's position "has the likely effect of establishing a previously unknown exception from the
Act's on-exchange trading requirement for a category of transactions which may be viewed as
'trade futures.'" This alludes to an exception to the options ban for commercial, non-speculative
commodity options purchased by persons in the trade. See generally Yeres, FIA REV., Sept.-Oct.,
1986, at 10-11.
The no-action letter falls short to the extent it characterizes the proposed commodity con-
tracts as forwards. Forwards must be commercial, merchandising transactions contemplating ac-
tual delivery. The proposed contracts can never satisfy this condition because they settle in cash.
Finally, the CEA does not permit the CFTC to abdicate its responsibility to administer the
exchange-trading requirement even if a party to an off-exchange futures transaction is regulated
by another federal agency. The extraordinary statutory grant to the CFTC of exclusive jurisdiction
over futures mandates that the CFTC not defer to other federal agencies on matters or activities
covered by the CEA. Cf. 132 CONG. REc. S13586 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Dixon).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Forwards and futures evolved as contractual solutions to distinct
problems. Forward contracts aided in the distribution of goods, while
futures contracts transferred risk from risk-averse producers and
merchants to speculators. When Congress first regulated futures trad-
ing, its primary concerns were the prevention of price manipulation and
the elimination of bucket shops. Congress concluded that price manipu-
lation arose from undue speculation. Futures trading was limited to
designated exchanges in order to harness speculation and to better
manage perceived abuses in the marketplace. Unregulated private ex-
changes and bucket shops were prohibited. Although all contracts for
the purchase or sale of commodities for future delivery had to be traded
on federally designated exchanges, forward contracts were excluded
from the definition of future delivery. The distinction in treatment was
based both on history and policy. The Treasury Amendment, adopted
in 1974, merely clarified the distinctions established in the early 1920s
between cash and futures transactions, with respect to certain enumer-
ated financial instruments that became commodities under the 1974
amendments.
The rule Congress articulated is an easy one-only cash transac-
tions and commercial, merchandising contracts contemplating actual
delivery are excused from the exchange-trading requirement. This re-
quirement promotes important public policy goals. Unless Congress
changes this rule, traders in off-exchange future-settling commodities
contracts that do not contemplate delivery run the risk of both civil and
criminal penalties for violating section 4(a) of the CEA.
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